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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ELMER 0. ALLEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
FEDERATED DAIRY FARMS, INC.,
and ALBERTSON'S, INC.,
Defendants and Respondents.

CaseNo.
13894

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiff-Appellant
against Defendants-Respondents for injuries arising from
a slip and fall accident involving cottage cheese on the
floor of the Respondent Albertson's store in Roy, Utah,
in connection with a food demonstration in the store by
Respondent Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., a/k/a Cream
0' Weber.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondents filed a joint Motion for Summary JudgDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mant which was granted by the trial Judge and from
which Appellant appeals. The trial Judge held that there
was no evidence of negligence on the part of Respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment
and for an order directing that the matter be set for trial
and tried on its merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cream 0 ' Weber, a/k/a Federated Dairy Farms, Inc.,
contacted the Albertson's store in Roy, Utah, and arranged for a cottage cheese demonstration in the store
on March 3, 1973 (R-45 Candland Dep. p. 11). Cream
0 ' Weber set up the cottage cheese display and hired
a lady demonstrator to display and push the sale of
Cream 0' Weber cottage cheese (R-45 Candland Dep. p.
8 L. 10, p. 4 L. 1). The cottage cheese was Cream 0 '
Weber brand and was owned by Albertson's at the time
of the demonstration (R-45 Candland Dep. p. 8 L, 22,
p. 9 L. 1). The purpose of the demonstration was to
promote the sale of Cream 0 ' Weber cottage cheese resulting in a joint profit for Cream 0 ' Weber and Albertson's (R-45 Candland Dep. p. 7 L. 5).
The lady demonstrator placed cottage cheese on
small one inch square crackers which were then offered
to adults and children alike (R-46 Blanchard Dep. p. 4 L.
24, p. 12).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The only waste receptacle for unwanted cottage
cheese was located at the side of the lady demonstrator.
There were no other waste receptacles placed throughout
the store for customers to discard unwanted cottage
cheese (R-46 Blanchard Dep. p. 5 L. 9, Sage Dep. p. 23
L. 6). After demonstrations of this type, unwanted samples were found throughout the store on shelves or other
locations (R-46 Sage Dep. p. 23 L. 9). "Well, wherever
— after a demo, on the next Monday, when you threw
freight, you'd find everything anywhere" (R-46 Sage
Dep. p. 23 L. 14).
There were no regular clean up or inspection procedures to look for spills occurring during the demonstration (R-46 Sage Dep. p. 9 L. 1, R-45 Candland Dep.
p. 11 L. 21, p. 13 L. 5). The general policy of the store,
whether a demonstration was going on or not, was for
employees to clean up any spills they happen to see
(R. 46 Sage Dep. p. 6 L. 25). There were no directives to
employees to make regular rounds of the store to look
for spills (R-46 Sage Dep. p. 7).
The floor involved was a beige color linoleum floor
(R-46 Sage Dep. p. 6 L. 18-23).
Crackers were selected and used for the cottage cheese
instead of the safer paper cups because "We try to do
it on a cracker, or somehting, to make it more tasty"
(R-45 Candland Dep. p. 10 L. 2). m
The cottage cheese demonstration was located at the
south end of a food shelf running north and south in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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store. The demonstration was also located in the main
aisle running east and west along the extreme south end
of the store (R-42 Allen Dep. - diagram). Appellant and
his wife had entered the store for shopping and had refused to take the cottage cheese sample offered them
(R-42 Allen Dep. p. 11 L. 17). They then continued
shopping up and down store aisles (R-42 Allen Dep. p.
11 L. 23). They later separated in the store with Appellant going to look for the hot roll mixes and his wife
going to the ice cream counter (R-42 Allen Dep. p. 8 L.
5). Appellant later walked down an aisle towards the
south end of the store and as he stepped around
the south end of the food, shelf, he slipped on a spoonful
of cottage cheese located on the floor and about one and
one-half to two feet from the south end of the shelf (R-42
Allen Dep. p. 13 L. 12, p. 15 L. 1 - 8 ) . Appellant went
head first into the milk rack located at the back of the
store (R-42 Allen Dep. p. 13 L. 16).
Appellant suffered severe injuries to his neck and
back ultimately resulting in hospitalization and surgery
for the removal of a disc in his neck and upper back
(R-42 Allen Dep. p. 25 L. 6 - 14).
The cottage cheese was located on the floor in the
south aisle of the store three to five feet away from the
lady demonstrator (R-43 Allen Dep. p. 5 L. 25, p. 6 L.
1 - 7, R-42 Allen Dep. p. 13 L. 24, R-46 Blanchard Dep.
p. 15 L. 20). There was nothing obstructing the view
of the lady demo from being able to see the cottage
cheese on the floor (R-46 Sage Dep. p. 17 L. 21).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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At the time of Appellant's fall, an Albertson's employee was stocking eggs in the south aisle to the west
of the fall and approximately ten feet away from the
cotage cheese on the floor (R-42 Allen Dep. p. 17 L. 9).
After the fall, there was no cracker found on the
floor near the cottage cheese indicating that either the
lady demo spilled some cottage cheese on the floor or a
patron spilled some and ate the cracker (R-42 Allen Dep.
p. 16 L. 14, R-43 Allen Dep. p. 6 L. 24).
The lady demo kept napkins on hand to clean up the
spills near her (R-46 Blanchard Dep. p. 5 L. 13 - 18).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
GENERAL LAW INVOLVED IN THE SUBJECT CASE.
The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by Article
I §10 of the Constitution of Utah.
A summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In
re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P. 2d 683.
Appellant is entitled to have all of the testimony and
all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom which tend
to prove the Appellant's case accepted as true, and all
conflicts and all evidence which tend to disprove Appel-
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lant's case must be disregarded. Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P. 2d 666.
Appellant is entitled! to have the evidence viewed in
the light most favorable to Appellant together with all
reasonable inferences. Koer v. Mayfair Markets, supra.
A store owner is obligated to exercise ordinary care
to keep the premises reasonably safe for the protection
of those patronizing his store but he is not an insurer
of the safety of his customers. Koer v. Mayfair Markets,
supra.
A store owner may be negligent if he knew, or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of
any hazardous condition and had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the same. Koer v. Mayfair Markets, supra.
In Long v. Smith Food King Store, et aL, No. 13252,
filed October 4, 1973, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
". . . That in order to impose liability for an injury resulting from some foreign substance or defective condition it must have existed for such
time and manner that in due care the defendant
either knew or should have known, and remedied
it; and the variant thereof, that if the condition
or defect was created by the defendant himself
or his agents or employees, the notice requirement does not apply."
The recent case of Maugeri v. Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company, 357 F. 2d 202 (New Jersey 1966),
involved injuries to a customer in a grocery store who
fell on some vegetable leaves located on the floor directly
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in front of produce counters which were slanted racks.
The Appellate Court observed as follows:
"At the outset it is imperative that we delineate between two different theories of recovery that may be pursued in a fall-down case
such as this. The first of these is where the
conduct of the defendant, in and of itself, creates a foreseeable risk of harm. In such cases
actual or constructive notice is not an element
of proof. The second theory is concerned with
a condition which arises through no fault of the
defendant. In these cases the defendant cannot be held liable unless he had actual or constructive notice of the condition. This distinction becomes meaningul especially where there
in an intervening act by a third party. Where
the intervening act is foreseeable the defendant
remains liable even if he does not have notice of
the condition created by it" (emphasis added).
"We believe that when plaintiff has shown
that the circumstances were such as to create
the reasonable probability that the dangerous
condition would occur, he need not also prove
actual or constructive notice of the specific condition. Factors bearing on the existence of such
reasonable probability would include the nature
of the business, the general condition of the premises, a pattern of conduct or recurring incidents."
The Court then held that the jury should have been
permitted to pass on the question as to whether or not
the defendant was negligent in the manner in which it
chose to refrigerate, display and sell its produce.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Little
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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v. Butner, 186 Kan. 75, 348 P. 2d 1022 (1960), bad a similar feet situation to the one at bar. The case involved
an action by a store customer against a store operator
and a meat packing company for injuries sustained by a
customer when she slipped and fell on samples of the
company's meats which had dropped to the floor after
being handed to other customers and children in the store
by a demonstrator. The Supreme Court of Kansas held
that the trial Court erred in sustaining demurrers of
defendants. The judgment was reversed and remanded
for trial. The Court held as follows:
1. The fact that an injury occurs is not sufficient
to establish liability and plaintiff cannot recover unless
he alleges and proves negligence which was the proximate
cause of the injury.
2. The customer had the burden of alleging and
proving a failure to exercise reasonable care for the customer's safety and that the damage had been occasioned
by some breach of duty on the part of the store.
3. One who enters a retail store for a purpose of
making a purchase is a business invitee.
4. One who, as a business invitee, entered a store
and shopped on the store premises in which groceries
were displayed for purchase, had every right to assume
that the floor of the store was suitable and safe to walk
upon and that she could carry out her purpose without
injury to herself.
5. One who engages in business and invites the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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public to come upon his premises to patronize him^ has
a duty to use due care to keep in reasonably safe condition those portions of premises in which the quests or
customers may be expected to come and go and he will
be liable to those who, without their own fault, are injured by his failure to do so. The store owner is bound
to use due care to protect his invitees from injury, not
only from defects in the premises but also from other
dangers arising from the use of the premises by himself
or his licensee.
6. Where injuries to customers are caused by dangerous conditions negligently created or maintained by
a proprietor of a business or his servants, proof that the
proprietor had notice of the dangerous condition is not
a prerequisite to recovery gainst the proprietor for such
injuries, since the condition is one which is traceable to
the proprietor's own act.
7. "The defendants, by their arrangement or agreement to conduct the demonstration, created a condition,
the amended petition alleges, whereby they knew or
should have known that patrons, customers and children
of tender years would drop particles of meat on the floor
causing it to become slick and slippery and creating a
dangerous condition in that area of the store where the
demonstration was being conducted. These allegations,
which are admitted by the demurrers, clearly bring the
instant case within the first class of cases making proof
of notice unnecessary."
In Jasko v. F. W. Woolworth Company, 494 P. 2d
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
839 (Colorado 1972), involving injuries to a customer in
a store who fell on a piece of pizza which was on a terrazzo floor in front of a pizza counter, the Supreme Court
of Colorado observed as follows:
"Rather, it was her contention that defendant's method of selling pizza was one which
leads inescapably to such mishaps as her own,
and that in such a situation conventional notice
requirements need not be met. We agree.
"The dangerous condition was created by
the store's method of sale. The steps taken to
constantly clean the floors show that the store
owner recognized the danger.
"The practice of extensive selling of slices
of pizza on waxed paper to customers who consume it while standing creates the reasonable
probability that food will drop to the floor. Food
on a terrazzo floor will create a dangerous condition. In such a situation, notice to the proprietor of the specific item on the flood need
not be shown."
An excellent toeatment of the supermarket slip and
fall case can be found in 18 U. of Fla. L. Rev. 440, "Supermarket Liability: Problems in Proving the Slip-and-Fall
Case in Florida." The writer of the article reiterates the
various avenaues of recovery as follows:
"(1) that the owner or his employees or
agents created the dangerous condition, or
(2) that the owner or his employees or
agents had actual notice of the dangerous conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dition and sufficient time in which to remedy
it, or
(3) that the condition existed long enough
to have been discovered and remedied (constructive notice).99
At page 442 of the article, the writer quotes from
the late Justice Terrell wherein the Justice urged that
"rules of conduct governing a business are not rules of
statute that the legislature is expected to promulgate,
they are rules of reason that emanate from the court and
which the court is expected to keep current." The article
then explores various fact situations which were held to
be jury questions by virtue of the store keepers alleged
negligent method of operation.
In the Conclusion portion of the article at page 455
the following is found:
"There can be no doubt that recovery in a
supermarket slip--and-fall case is a sometime
thing. The avenues to recovery are blockaded
at some points, poorly lighted at others, and virtually nonexistent at still others.
"Why should these burdens be placed upon
the plaintiff who is injured in a supermarket?
The answers *$&& not satisfactory. We cannot
assume that most slip-and-fall cases are fraudulent. Nor can we believe that most shoppers are
careless. Most certainly, we cannot proclaim that
the burden of proof must be what it is because
the supermarket is just another piece of business property.
"It is precisely because the supermarket is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not just another business property that so many
slip-and-fall cases occur on its premises. And
it is this same reason that largely accounts for
the extreme difficulty in proving a supermarket
slip-and-fall case. Very few, if any, of the other
business properties combine the following:
(1) hard and comparatively slick floors,
(2) push carts,
(3) the same weekly, predominantly female, clientele,
(4) eye-catdiing displays,
(5) large numbers of small and potentially
hazardous items in open bins,
(6) almost continuous replenishment of
products,
(7) customer unassisted handling of products,
(8) relatively high volume of persons on
property each day,
(9) well-defined shopping flow,
(10). high proportion of part-time help, and
other features that distinguish the modern selfservice supermarket."
The writer continues at page 456:
"From our study, the law governing supermarket liability can be criticized for its inconsistency, reliance on chance modes of proof, and
frequent denial of relief without jury consideration. The existing law would seem to prefer
that a sizable number of valid claims are denied relief than to allow even the possibility
that an unjust claim would sneak through. A
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rethinking of supermarket liability is certainly
desirable/'
And further at page 457:
"Whether this particular solution is adopted
is not the main issue, however. The larger issue
is whether outdated concepts of liability and
proof will be allowed to continue in the supermarket setting. In Justice Terrell's words: 'In
light of the disparity between the modern food
market and the old time grocery, it is out of the
question to contend that they are governed by
the same rules of care.'"
POINT II.
RESPONDENTS' OWN CONDUCT CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION
AND REASONABLY FORESEEABLE RISK
WHICH CAUSED APPELLANT'S FALL
AND SUBSEQUENT INJURY AND ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE IS
UNNECESSARY.
Respondents were negligent in serving the cottage
cheese on small crackers one inch square instead of in
the much safer paper cups. It was foreseeable that cottage cheese on crackers served to adulte and children
would find its way to the floor of the store. The only
answer of Respondents is that the crackers made the
sample more "tasty."
Respondents were negligent in not providing waste
receptacles throughout the store for children and adults
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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who did not desire to eat the cottage cheese sample and
desired to dispose of the same.
Respondents were negligent in not providing for
regular inspections of the store floor during the demonstration since it was foreseeable that during a demonstration of this type cottage cheese would likely be spilled
on the floor causing a very slippery and hazardous condition.
Respondent Cream 0 ' Weber had an employee within
three to five feet from the cottage cheese sample and
Respondent Albertson's had an employee within ten
feet of the cottage cheese sample at the time of the fall.
Respondents were negligent in not seeing the sample on
the floor and cleaning it up.
The lady demonstrator was within three to five feet
from the cottage cheese sample and because of this close
proximity, it is a jury question as to whether or not she
spilled the sample herself or whether someone else spilled
it and she should have seen it and cleaned it up.
POINT III.

RESPONDENTS WERE NEGLIGENT IN
THAT THEY HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE COTTAGE CHEESE SAMPLE ON THE FLOOR.
Respondent Cream 0 ' Weber's lady demonstrator
was within three to five feet away from the cottage cheese
sample and defendant Albertson's had an employee ten
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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feet away from the sample with no obstructions between
said employees and the sample. It is a jury question
whether or not defendants had constructive notice of said
sample and whether they should have cleaned it up prior
to Appellant's fall.
In the argument of the subject case in the trial Court,
Respondents relied heavily on the case of Long v. Smith
Food King Store, et a/., supra. This case is very similar
to the case at bar except for the following factual differences:
1. It is more likely that the pumpkin pie samples
in the Long case would be eaten more readily by the
store patrons, especially children, than the cottage cheese
cheese samples making it more likely that more cottage
cheese would find the floor than the pumpkin pie. This
would be particularly so without waste receptacles provided throughout the store.
2. In the Long case, the plaintiff was in a different
aisle than the lady demonstrator and in the case at bar
Appellant was in the same aisle with the lady demonstrator approximaitely three feet away from where she
was serving the cottage cheese samples and with no
visual obstructions.
Also, with utmost respect for this high Court, there
is still a profound question as to whether or not the Long
v. Smith Food King Store, et al, case was a "notice" case
or one involving the primary negligence of the defendants
in the method in which they conducted the food demon-
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stration. It is hoped that the additional legal authorities
cited in the subject brief will assist the Court in a possible modification of the ratio decidendi in the Long case.
It is one thing to have a grape drop out of a shopping basket and the requirement of notice before liability
attaches to the store keeper, and quite another when a
store keeper embarks on a special sales demonstration
which increases the reasonably foreseeable risks to the
safety of the customers without taking any additional
precautions.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that he is entitled
to a jury trial on the issues of Respondents' primary negligence in failing to serve the cottage cheese in paper cups
instead of on one inch crackers, in failing to provide additional waste receptacles throughout the store, in failing
to make regular inspections of the floor area during the
day of the demonstration and in Respondents' failure
to clean up the cottage cheese even though their employees were stationed in very close proximity to it.
Appellant further submits that actual or constructive notice of this condition was not required in this situation. However, it is clear that Respondents had constructive notice of the cottage cheese sample because of
its close proximity to the lady demonstrator and the other
store employee.
Appellant further urges this high Court that when
it considers the balancing of social interests between the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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store patrons and the store keeper, the reasonable foreseeability of the risks involved in such a demonstration,
and the severe and permanent injuries that continue to
occur in supermarkets, that the thrust of the legal principles enunciated will have the effect of justice to all
parties as well as making supermarkets safer places for
customers to venture into while acquiring the staples of
life.
If a store decided to demonstrate a new type of
thumbtack by distributing the tacks to children and
adults alike and with no precautions taken to guard
against the tacks being dropped on the floor, we would
be horrified because of the likelihood that many people
would step on the tacks receiving puncture wounds in
their feet. However, it is ironic that food dropped on
hard floor surfaces usually causes greater injuries than
do thumbtacks. The thumbtack injury would require a
tetanus shot and result in a routine recovery in most
cases. The slip and fall cases involving food on hard floors
frequently result in sundry fractures and severe permanent injuries.
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse
the action of the trial Court and remand the case for
trial on its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD H. THORNLEY
Attorney for
Plaintiff and Appellant
2610 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
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